BEYOND STRUCTURE: RE-EVALUATING BOARD RISK COMMITTEE EFFECTIVENESS AND FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE IN EMERGING MARKETS

AIGIENOHUWA, Osarenren Osasere (PhD)[1]; OHONBA, Nosa (PhD)[1]

[1]Department of Accounting, University of Benin, Benin City, Nigeria

Correspondence: **blessedosas@yahoo.com; *+2347032870685***

Abstract

This study examined whether functional attributes of the Board Risk Committee, specifically independence and diligence, significantly influenced the financial performance of firms operating in emerging markets, addressing long-standing concerns that structural compliance has not translated into meaningful performance outcomes. The objective was to reassess the value relevance of Board Risk Committee independence and meeting frequency in driving corporate financial performance measured by Return on Assets.The study adopted an ex-post facto research design and utilised secondary panel data drawn from annual reports of 50 listed firms, applying descriptive statistics, correlation analysis, and a comprehensive set of diagnostic tests. Initial Ordinary Least Square, fixed-effects, and random-effects estimations produced non-normal residuals, heteroskedasticity, and outlier sensitivity; thus, robust regression was employed as the final estimator to generate reliable coefficients.The findings revealed that Board Risk Committee independence had a positive and statistically significant effect on Return on Assets, while Board Risk Committee diligence (meeting frequency) showed an insignificant relationship, indicating that functional oversight, not structural activity, drives financial performance. Based on these results, the study recommended that regulators strengthen independence guidelines, boards prioritise substantive oversight over meeting frequency, and investors treat BRC independence as a credible governance signal.

Keywords: *Board Risk Committee, Corporate Governance, Financial Performance, Independence*

1. Introduction

The growing complexity of business environments in emerging markets has elevated the importance of risk governance, prompting regulators to strengthen board-level oversight structures such as the Board Risk Committee (BRC). In markets characterised by macroeconomic volatility, weak investor protection, and high exposure to financial and operational shocks, Board Risk Committees are expected to serve as critical mechanisms for monitoring risk-taking and safeguarding firm value. Recent studies show that board-level risk governance can play a meaningful role in shaping organisational outcomes, but the effectiveness of BRCs varies widely across emerging economies (Agyei-Mensah, 2021; Naciti, 2022). Although many firms comply with the structural requirements of governance codes—such as constituting committees with "experts," meeting a minimum number of members, or holding frequent meetings—evidence increasingly suggests that structural compliance alone does not translate into improved financial performance (Ofoegbu & Okoye, 2021; Ahmed & Safdar, 2023). Instead, the functional quality of the committee, particularly the independence of its members and the substance of its oversight activities, appears to be more important in ensuring meaningful risk governance (Kyere & Ausloos, 2020; García-Sánchez et al., 2021).

Despite this recognition, many emerging-market firms continue to operate BRCs as symbolic governance structures rather than effective monitoring bodies. Weak regulatory enforcement, limited transparency, and the prevalence of influential executives often undermine the independence of committee members. Empirical research focusing on BRC characteristics has produced mixed results: studies in Asia and Africa report that size, expertise, and meeting frequency have inconsistent or insignificant effects on performance (Elamer et al., 2020; Buallay, 2022), whereas independence consistently shows stronger associations with firm value and risk outcomes (Kyere & Ausloos, 2020; Dao & Nguyen, 2020). However, most studies rely on ordinary least squares or traditional panel estimators that assume normally distributed errors and ignore outliers—conditions rarely satisfied in emerging-market financial data (Tawiah & Boolaky, 2021). The absence of robust estimation

techniques limits the reliability of prior findings and leaves a methodological gap in the governance literature.

Against this backdrop, this study addresses a central question: To what extent do Board Risk Committee independence and diligence influence the financial performance of firms in emerging markets? The objective of the study is to empirically investigate whether BRC independence and BRC diligence (measured through meeting frequency) exert significant effects on corporate financial performance, while challenging the dominant assumption that structural compliance alone ensures effective governance. By adopting robust regression techniques capable of mitigating the influence of outliers, non-normality, and heteroskedasticity, this study provides more reliable insights into the functional attributes of risk committees that truly matter for firm performance in emerging-market contexts.

This study is significant for several reasons. It shifts the governance discourse from a narrow focus on structural committee attributes toward a more substantive evaluation of functional effectiveness, thereby enriching corporate governance literature in emerging markets. It offers regulators new evidence to refine independence requirements and strengthen monitoring reforms. For corporate boards, the findings underscore the importance of appointing genuinely independent members who can exercise objective oversight rather than merely meeting structural compliance mandates. For investors and analysts, BRC independence emerges as an important qualitative signal of firm-level risk governance quality, informing investment decisions in markets where formal compliance does not always guarantee accountability.

2. Literature Review

Conceptual Review

The Board Risk Committee (BRC) is an institutional governance mechanism charged with overseeing risk management at the board level, ensuring that firms identify, assess, monitor and respond to financial, operational and strategic risks (Erin, 2021; OECD, 2023). In emerging markets, the BRC is increasingly viewed as a differentiator of firm resilience amid regulatory pressures, macro-economic volatility and heightened stakeholder expectations (Hassan & Renteria-Guerrero, 2023). While governance codes emphasise the formal attributes of the BRC—such as committee size, composition and meeting frequency—recent empirical evidence questions whether these structural attributes translate into improved financial outcomes (Okafor et al., 2020; Waweru, 2020).

A key attribute of the BRC is independence, defined as the presence of non-executive, non-affiliated members on the committee who are free from managerial or business ties that compromise oversight (Alduneibat, 2023; Udoh et al., 2023). Measurement typically involves the proportion of independent members on the BRC, absence of related-party relationships and tenure beyond a specified minimum (Alduneibat, 2023). Empirical findings suggest that higher BRC independence is associated with improved monitoring, enhanced risk oversight and better financial performance—especially in emerging markets where shareholder protections and institutional enforcement are weak (Erin, 2021; Udoh et al., 2023).

Diligence of the BRC is typically proxied by the frequency of meetings held annually. The governance logic is that more frequent meetings allow for more timely oversight, better responsiveness to emerging risks, and stronger alignment of risk strategy with performance (Iwasaki, 2024; Okafor et al., 2020). However, in emerging markets evidence is ambivalent: some studies find frequent meetings have little effect on performance when committees operate symbolically (Alduneibat, 2023; Waweru, 2020).

Return on Assets (ROA) is a widely used accounting-based indicator of firm financial performance, capturing how efficiently assets are utilised to generate profit (Akinyemi & Adegboye, 2021). In governance studies, ROA is especially suitable when examining risk oversight structures because effective risk committees are expected to improve asset utilisation, reduce losses from unmanaged risks and thus enhance ROA. The use of ROA in emerging markets is justified given the heightened importance of asset efficiency and risk management under institutional constraints.

Theoretical Review

Agency Theory posits that the separation of ownership and management creates a risk of managerial opportunism, which independent directors and committees can help mitigate through monitoring (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Within the BRC context, independence is central because independent members can challenge management's risk decisions, reduce information asymmetry, and enforce accountability—thereby improving performance. The emerging-market context amplifies this need as enforcement mechanisms are weaker and agency risks higher.

Resource Dependence Theory argues that boards provide firms with access to valuable resources such as expertise, networks, and strategic legitimacy (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Applied to BRCs, structural attributes such as size and expertise matter because they enhance the committee's resource endowment. However, in emerging markets these resources rarely generate performance gains unless independence and autonomy are present to convert those resources into effective oversight (Okafor et al., 2020). Thus, independence becomes a moderating factor in whether committee expertise or size translate into performance.

Stakeholder Theory expands governance beyond shareholder interests, emphasising that firms must consider the interests of employees, customers, regulators and community—not just profit maximisation (Freeman, 1984). The BRC's role aligns with this broader risk governance mandate by ensuring that risk-taking does not jeopardise stakeholder welfare and long-term viability. Independent risk committees may enhance legitimacy, transparency and stakeholder trust—factors that underpin sustainable performance in emerging-market firms.

Empirical Review

Empirical studies across emerging markets increasingly emphasize Board Risk Committee independence as the most critical determinant of effective risk oversight and financial outcomes. In Nigeria, Erin (2021) found that independent directors significantly strengthen monitoring quality, reduce opportunistic risk-taking, and improve firm profitability. Similarly, Udoh, et al (2023) reported that risk committee independence enhances asset efficiency and reduces financial misreporting, thereby improving both ROA and ROE. Evidence from broader African markets also supports this pattern. Waweru (2020), using a multi-country dataset from East Africa, concluded that independent risk committees exert stronger control over strategic risks and are associated with superior firm performance, even where other committee structures remain weak.

Outside Africa, results remain consistent. Hassan and Renteria-Guerrero (2023) examined Latin American financial firms and found that independence improves corporate resilience and reduces earnings volatility. In Asian markets, Alduneibat (2023) showed that risk committees dominated by independent members significantly reduce risk exposure, contributing directly to higher profitability and lower default propensity. These studies collectively suggest that independence remains the most value-relevant BRC attribute globally, particularly in jurisdictions characterised by weak institutional enforcement and high agency conflicts. In line with findings that independence is the most functionally relevant attribute of the BRC, the study proposes the following hypothesis: *H_1: Board Risk Committee Independence has a significant effect on corporate financial performance.*

Evidence on the effect of risk committee meeting frequency is mixed and context-dependent. In Nigeria, Okafor, et al (2020) found that more frequent meetings were associated with improved board attention to risk, though the effect on ROA and ROE was statistically weak. Similarly, Erin (2021) reported that while diligent committees meet more often, such meetings do not automatically translate into superior financial outcomes when meetings are procedural rather than analytically rigorous.

Studies from other emerging markets reinforce this inconsistency. Waweru (2020) observed that in East Africa, meeting frequency had no significant association with firm performance once independence and expertise were controlled for, arguing that many meetings in those contexts reflect symbolic compliance rather than substantive oversight. Iwasaki (2024), using evidence from Asian firms, found that meeting frequency only enhances performance when paired with strong independence and information transparency. In weak institutional environments, frequent meetings may simply signal risk exposure, not risk management. Because BRC diligence—often measured through meeting frequency—remains conceptually important but empirically inconsistent, it is essential to examine

whether BRC meeting frequency materially shapes corporate financial performance**.** *H_2: Board Risk Committee Diligence (meeting frequency) has a significant effect on corporate financial performance.*

Summary and Research Gap

The empirical literature shows that structural attributes of the Board Risk Committee (such as size and expertise) have been widely studied but remain unreliable predictors of firm performance, particularly in emerging markets. The most consistent evidence points to BRC independence as the only functional attribute with strong performance implications, yet this variable has historically been underexamined as a standalone determinant. Furthermore, most existing studies rely on traditional estimation techniques (OLS, fixed effects, random effects) despite the presence of non-normality, heteroskedasticity, and outliers in governance datasets. Very few studies adopt robust regression approaches capable of handling these data limitations. Consequently, there is a clear need for research that focuses on functional governance (independence and diligence), employs more rigorous estimation techniques, and re-evaluates risk governance beyond structural compliance.

3. Methodology

This study adopted an ex-post facto quantitative research design, relying on panel data obtained from the audited annual reports of listed firms in an emerging-market context. The population comprised firms listed on the Nigerian Exchange, while the sample consisted of 50 listed Nigerian firms with complete and reliable disclosures on Board Risk Committee (BRC) attributes and financial performance. Secondary data were extracted manually from published financial statements and governance reports.

The dependent variable was corporate financial performance, proxied by Return on Assets (ROA). The key independent variables were BRC Independence (measured as the proportion of independent, non-executive members on the committee) and BRC Diligence (proxied by risk-committee meeting frequency). Other BRC structural attributes such as size and expertise were included as control variables to isolate the functional effect of independence and diligence.

The baseline model is expressed as:

$$ROA_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 BRCIND_{it} + \beta_2 BRCDIL_{it} + \varepsilon_{it}$$

Where:

- ROA_{it}= Financial performance of firm *i* at time *t*.
- $BRCIND_{it}$= BRC Independence.
- $BRCDIL_{it}$= BRC Diligence (meeting frequency).
- ε_{it}= error term.

Initial estimations using pooled OLS, fixed effects, and random effects models showed clear evidence of non-normality, heteroskedasticity, and outlier influence, rendering those models unsuitable. A suite of diagnostics—including Shapiro–Wilk and Skewness/Kurtosis tests for normality, correlation analysis, Breusch–Pagan and Modified Wald tests for heteroskedasticity, VIF for multicollinearity, Ramsey RESET for model specification, and LM and Hausman tests for panel adequacy—confirmed these data irregularities. Consequently, robust regression (rreg) was selected as the final estimation technique because it down-weights extreme observations and provides stable, reliable coefficients under the imperfect data conditions characteristic of emerging-market governance research.

4. Results and Discussion

4.1 Descriptive Statistics

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Study Variables (N = 250)

Variable	Mean	Median	Maximum	Minimum	Std. Dev.	Observations (N)
ROA	0.047	0.020	6.20	-1.80	0.43	250
BRC_IND	0.85	0.67	67.00	0.00	4.20	250
BRC_MEET	3.20	3.00	12.00	0.00	2.10	250

Keys: ROA – Return on Assets; BRC_IND - Board Risk Committee Independence; BRC_MEET - Board Risk Committee Diligence

Source: Researchers' Computation (2025) using Stata 17

Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for the study variables, showing the distributional characteristics of financial performance and Board Risk Committee attributes. The mean ROA of 0.047 indicates generally low profitability among firms, with a wide spread between the minimum (-1.80) and maximum (6.20), suggesting considerable performance variability within the sample. Board Risk Committee Independence (BRC_IND) has a mean value of 0.85 but displays an unusually large standard deviation (4.20) and a maximum of 67.00, reflecting extreme observations and potential data irregularities. Board Risk Committee Diligence (BRC_MEET) averages 3.20 meetings per year, with values ranging from 0 to 12, indicating differences in how frequently firms conduct risk committee activities. Overall, the descriptive statistics highlight substantial variability and the presence of extreme values, reinforcing the need for robust estimation techniques.

4.2 Diagnostic Tests

Table 2: Shapiro–Wilk Test for Normality

Variable	Obs	W	V	z	Prob > z
ROA	250	0.23726	138.333	11.469	0.0000
BRC_IND	250	0.07501	167.758	11.918	0.0000
BRC_MEET	250	0.95325	8.479	4.973	0.0000

The Shapiro–Wilk results in Table 2 show that all variables have p-values of 0.0000, meaning the null hypothesis of normality is strongly rejected for ROA, BRC_IND, and BRC_MEET. The extremely low W-statistics for ROA (0.2373) and BRC_IND (0.0750) further confirm severe deviations from normality, likely driven by outliers and skewed distributions. Even BRC_MEET, with a W of 0.9532, fails the normality test at the 1% level. These results justify the use of robust regression since traditional OLS assumptions regarding normally distributed residuals are violated.

Table 3: Correlation Matrix of Study Variables (N = 250)

Variables	ROA	BRC_IND	BRC_MEET
ROA	1.0000		
BRC_IND	0.0251	1.0000	
BRC_MEET	0.0268	0.0303	1.0000

Table 3 shows weak pairwise correlations among the study variables, with all coefficients close to zero. ROA has marginal positive correlations with BRC_IND (r = 0.0251) and BRC_MEET (r = 0.0268), suggesting that neither attribute demonstrates strong linear association with financial performance at the bivariate level. Similarly, the relationship between BRC_IND and BRC_MEET (r = 0.0303) is negligible. The absence of high correlations indicates no multicollinearity concerns and suggests that any significant effects detected in the regression model will not be due to variable redundancy.

Table 4: Summary of Diagnostic Test Results

Diagnostic Test	Test Statistic	p-Value	Decision Rule	Conclusion
Breusch–Pagan / Cook–Weisberg Test for Heteroskedasticity (OLS)	$\chi^2 = 1.29$	0.2568	$p > 0.05 \rightarrow$ Fail to reject H_0	No heteroskedasticity in OLS residuals
Variance Inflation Factor (VIF)	Mean VIF = 1.43	—	VIF < 10 → No multicollinearity	Multicollinearity not a concern
Ramsey RESET Test	F(3,242) = 2.71	0.0460	$p < 0.05 \rightarrow$ Reject H_0	Model suffers from omitted variable bias
Breusch–Pagan Lagrange Multiplier Test (LM Test for Random Effects)	$chibar^2 = 0.00$	1.0000	$p > 0.05 \rightarrow$ Fail to reject H_0	Random-effects not appropriate; Pooled OLS preferred
Modified Wald Test for Groupwise	$\chi^2(53) = 1.24\times10^9$	0.0000	$p < 0.05 \rightarrow$ Reject H_0	Groupwise heteroskedasticity present

Heteroskedasticity (FE)				under Fixed Effects
Hausman Test (FE vs RE)	$\chi^2(4)$ = 0.52	0.9717	p > 0.05 → Fail to reject H_0	Random-effects preferred over fixed effects, but LM test invalidates RE

The diagnostic tests reveal important insights into the suitability of different estimation techniques for the study. The Breusch–Pagan/Cook–Weisberg test (χ^2 = 1.29, p = 0.2568) indicates no evidence of heteroskedasticity under OLS, while the Variance Inflation Factor (mean VIF = 1.43) confirms that multicollinearity is not a concern. However, the Ramsey RESET test (F = 2.71, p = 0.0460) suggests that the model suffers from omitted variable bias and that OLS functional form is mis-specified. For panel diagnostics, the Breusch–Pagan Lagrange Multiplier test (p = 1.0000) shows that random-effects modelling is inappropriate since pooled OLS is preferred, whereas the Modified Wald test under fixed effects confirms severe groupwise heteroskedasticity (χ^2 = 1.24×10⁹, p = 0.0000). Although the Hausman test (χ^2 = 0.52, p = 0.9717) favours random effects over fixed effects, the LM test invalidates the use of random effects, creating inconsistency among traditional panel estimators. Taken together, these results demonstrate that conventional OLS, fixed effects, and random effects models are unreliable due to mis-specification and heteroskedasticity concerns, thereby justifying the adoption of robust regression as the most appropriate and reliable estimation technique for the study.

4.3 Robust Regression Results

Table 5: Robust Regression Results

Variables	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-value	p-value	95% Confidence Interval
BRC_IND	0.0576359	0.0188661	3.06	0.003	0.0204748 to 0.0947971
BRC_MEET	0.0038281	0.0030057	1.27	0.204	–0.0020924 to 0.0097486
Constant	–0.0194378	0.0108525	–1.79	0.075	–0.0408144 to 0.0019388

Model Summary	Value
Number of Observations	249
F-Statistic (4, 244)	5.26
Prob > F	0.0004

Source: Researchers' Computation (2025) using Stata 17

Table 5 presents the results of the robust regression model, which accounts for non-normality, heteroskedasticity, and outliers. The coefficient for BRC Independence (0.0576) is positive and statistically significant (p = 0.003), indicating that greater independence within the risk committee enhances financial performance. Conversely, BRC Diligence (BRC_MEET) is positive but insignificant (coefficient = 0.0038; p = 0.204), suggesting that meeting frequency does not materially affect ROA. The constant term is negative and marginally significant at the 10% level. With an F-statistic of 5.26 and a p-value of 0.0004, the overall model is statistically significant, confirming that the explanatory variables jointly influence financial performance. These results reinforce the central finding that independence—not diligence—is the primary driver of BRC effectiveness in emerging markets.

4.4 Discussion

The findings of this study provide strong evidence that Board Risk Committee (BRC) independence is the only attribute that consistently and significantly enhances corporate financial performance in emerging-market firms. This outcome aligns with the core propositions of Agency Theory, which emphasises the value of having non-executive, non-affiliated directors who can provide objective oversight, reduce information asymmetry, and constrain managerial opportunism. Extant empirical studies support this pattern: Erin (2021) documents that independent directors strengthen monitoring quality in Nigerian firms; Udoh et al. (2023) show that independence improves asset efficiency and reduces financial misreporting; and Waweru (2020) also finds that independence enhances strategic risk oversight across East African markets. Similar results in Asia and Latin America reported by Alduneibat (2023) and Hassan and Renteria-Guerrero (2023) reinforce the

conclusion that independence is globally the most functionally relevant BRC characteristic. Thus, the significant positive effect of BRC independence in this study corroborates the argument that meaningful risk governance depends less on formal committee structures and more on the autonomy and objectivity of those charged with oversight.

In contrast, the study finds that BRC diligence, proxied by meeting frequency, has no statistically significant effect on ROA. This outcome is consistent with the mixed and often contradictory evidence documented in emerging-market literature. Although the governance logic suggests that more frequent meetings should reflect active oversight (Iwasaki, 2024; Okafor et al., 2020), many committees operate symbolically rather than substantively. Erin (2021) observes that frequent meetings do not necessarily translate into improved financial performance unless they involve rigorous analytical discussions. Waweru (2020) similarly notes that in East African firms, meeting frequency often reflects procedural compliance rather than meaningful engagement. These findings suggest that diligence without independence may merely increase the number of routine meetings without influencing financial outcomes, especially in environments with weak regulatory enforcement and limited board accountability. The insignificance of meeting frequency in this study therefore confirms the critique that diligence is only effective when backed by genuine independence, high-quality information flows, and a culture of accountability.

Taken together, the results have broader implications for risk governance practices in emerging markets. First, they indicate that structural features of the BRC—such as size, expertise, and meeting frequency—may fulfil regulatory requirements yet fail to influence performance unless accompanied by functional independence. This reinforces arguments in Resource Dependence Theory that governance structures only add value when members possess autonomy to utilise their expertise effectively (Okafor et al., 2020). Second, Stakeholder Theory highlights the importance of risk governance in safeguarding stakeholder interests, and the findings suggest that independence enhances stakeholder legitimacy by promoting transparency and accountability (Freeman, 1984). Finally, the study underscores the need for emerging-market regulators to shift governance expectations away from box-ticking compliance toward substantive oversight, where independence, informed judgment, and strategic engagement—not structural formality—drive financial outcomes. In summary, risk governance reforms should prioritise strengthening director independence, increasing transparency of committee activities, and ensuring that BRCs act as active monitors rather than symbolic organs.

5. Conclusion and Implications

This study examined whether Board Risk Committee independence and diligence meaningfully influence the financial performance of firms in an emerging-market context. Using ROA as the performance metric and employing robust regression due to documented non-normality, outliers, and heteroskedasticity, the results reveal a clear pattern. Board Risk Committee independence demonstrated a positive and statistically significant effect on financial performance, affirming its central role in strengthening monitoring quality and reducing opportunistic risk-taking. Board Risk Committee diligence—proxied by meeting frequency—showed a positive but statistically insignificant effect, indicating that more frequent meetings do not automatically translate into improved financial outcomes. Overall, the findings show that functional attributes (independence) are more consequential than structural or procedural attributes (meeting frequency) in driving performance.

The study concludes that functional independence—not structural design—drives financial performance in emerging-market firms. The ability of a Board Risk Committee to exercise objective oversight, challenge management, and enforce risk discipline is far more important than formal attributes such as the number of meetings held. In weak institutional environments, meeting frequency often reflects symbolic compliance rather than substantive engagement. Thus, while BRCs remain an essential component of risk governance frameworks, their value derives primarily from the independence and effectiveness of committee members rather than their structural configuration.

For regulators and corporate boards, the findings emphasise that the substance of independence—not committee size or meeting frequency—is what drives effective risk oversight, calling for stricter independence standards and higher-quality deliberations. For investors, BRC independence serves as a credible governance signal, helping distinguish firms with strong oversight from those at higher risk of poor performance

Future studies should examine cross-country differences, introduce moderating variables such as ownership structure or audit quality, and apply qualitative methods to better understand why some BRCs function symbolically despite structural compliance. This study is limited by its reliance on secondary annual-report data, the use of ROA as the sole performance metric, and the restricted generalisability of findings beyond similar emerging-market institutional environments.

References

Akinyemi, O., & Adegboye, A. A. (2021). Corporate governance mechanisms and firm performance in emerging markets: Evidence from Nigeria. *Cogent Economics & Finance, 9*(1), 1892926. https://doi.org/10.1080/23322039.2021.1892926

Alduneibat, H. (2023). Risk governance effectiveness and financial performance: Evidence from emerging Asian markets. *Journal of Risk and Financial Management, 16*(2), 85. https://doi.org/10.3390/jrfm16020085

Agyei-Mensah, B. K. (2021). The relationship between board characteristics and environmental performance: Evidence from African listed firms. *Corporate Governance: The International Journal of Business in Society, 21*(4), 563–587.

Ahmed, E., & Safdar, R. (2023). Corporate governance quality and firm performance: Evidence from emerging markets. *Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business, 10*(1), 23–32.

Buallay, A. (2022). Corporate governance and firm performance: Evidence from MENA banks. *International Journal of Finance & Economics, 27*(1), 760–776.

Dao, B., & Nguyen, A. (2020). Independent directors, risk-taking and performance: Evidence from emerging markets. *Asia-Pacific Journal of Financial Studies, 49*(2), 245–268.

Elamer, A., Ntim, C., & Abdou, H. (2020). Risk governance and corporate performance: Evidence from financial institutions. *International Review of Financial Analysis, 72*, 101–506.

Erin, O. A. (2021). Board characteristics and risk management effectiveness in Nigerian listed firms. *International Journal of Disclosure and Governance, 18*(3), 230–245. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41310-021-00112-9

Freeman, R. E. (1984). *Strategic management: A stakeholder approach*. Pitman Publishing.

García-Sánchez, I. M., Hussain, N., Khan, S., & Martínez-Ferrero, J. (2021). Impact of board independence on sustainability performance: The moderating role of institutional context. *Journal of Cleaner Production, 318*, 128–474.

Hassan, M. K., & Renteria-Guerrero, L. (2023). Board oversight, risk governance and performance of Latin American firms. *Emerging Markets Review, 54*, 100972. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ememar.2022.100972

Iwasaki, I. (2024). Corporate governance reforms, board diligence and firm performance in Asian emerging economies. *Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 41*(1), 145–170. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10490-022-09864-w

Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. *Journal of Financial Economics, 3*(4), 305–360. https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405X(76)90026-X

Kyere, M., & Ausloos, M. (2020). Corporate governance and firm performance in emerging markets: A multivariate analysis. *Journal of Economic Studies, 47*(3), 563–584.

Naciti, V. (2022). Corporate governance quality and firm performance in developing countries. *Sustainability, 14*(2), 876.

OECD. (2023). *OECD Corporate Governance Factbook 2023*. OECD Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1787/c2b0c928-en

Ofoegbu, G., & Okoye, E. (2021). Corporate governance disclosure and firm value in Nigeria. *Cogent Business & Management, 8*(1), 1880195.

Okafor, T. G., Olayinka, I. M., & Dabor, A. O. (2020). Corporate board characteristics and enterprise risk management disclosure: Evidence from Nigeria. *Heliyon, 6*(11), e05516. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.heliyon.2020.e05516

Pfeffer, J., & Salancik, G. R. (1978). *The external control of organizations: A resource dependence perspective*. Harper & Row.

Tawiah, V., & Boolaky, P. (2021). Accounting quality in emerging markets: A review of methodological gaps. *Journal of International Accounting Research, 20*(3), 125–147.

Udoh, E., Ekanem, B., & Ekpo, N. (2023). Board risk committee independence and financial performance of listed firms in Nigeria. *African Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance, 12*(2), 145–162. https://doi.org/10.1504/AJAAF.2023.100565

Waweru, N. (2020). Corporate governance and firm performance in African markets: A review and synthesis. *International Journal of Corporate Governance, 11*(1), 1–22. https://doi.org/10.1504/IJCG.2020.105847